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CONDOMINIUMS IN WASHINGTON
INTRODUCTION
The continued growth of our population, coupled with the move-
ment of people from rural to urban areas,1 has created a host of prob-
lems not the least of which has been housing. This concentration of
population near urban centers has resulted in the phenomenon of
"urban sprawl" and is reflected in the startling increase in the price
of land in these areas 3 Since this population trend is expected to
continue,4 it has given rise to the practical necessity of making more
efficient use of land by the construction of high-rise multi-family
dwellings in reasonable proximity to facilities for employment, edu-
cation, recreation, entertainment, and public services.
The problem of the developer and planner is to make living in
multi-unit, high-rise structures attractive enough to induce a large
segment of the urban population to desire to live in such projects.
Condominium ownership has been touted as a solution to the prob-
lem, since unlike renting or owning shares in a cooperative apart-
ment, it gives the apartment dweller a sense of ownership.5 This
1. This situation is illustrated by the following table, which appears in 1 TaMMG
MEGALoPOLis 98 (H. Eldredge ed. 1967):
Percentage Increase in U.S. Population Within and Outside
Metropolitan Areas in the Preceding Decade, 1910-1960.
1960 1950 1940 1930 1920 1910
Total U.S. Population 18.5 14.5 7.2 16.1 14.9 21.0
All Metropolitan Areas Reported 26.4 22.0 8.1 28.3 26.9 34.6
Central Cities 1.5 13.9 5.1 22.3 25.2 33.6
Suburban Areas 61.7 35.6 15.1 44.0 32.0 38.2
Areas Outside Metropolitan Areas 7.1 6.1 6.5 7.9 9.6 16.4
2. During a recent five-year period 43 percent of the population increase in the United
States took place in the fringe around metropolitan areas. Id. at 11.
3. Information issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the forest products
industry shows that the cost of a building site was the most rapidly increasing component
in the purchase of a new home in the decade ending with 1968. With the index base at
1957-59 = 100, the index reached a level of 180 in 1968, or an increase of 80% in ten
years. The general cost-of-living rose about 30% in the same period. Seattle Times,
April 20, 1969, at C1, col. 2-5.
4. See Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 1 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Kerr].
S. The sense of ownership that goes with cooperatives in all forms, and which is
strongest in condominium, may well be the principal advantage over a normal
tenancy. The owner can sink his roots into his apartment with an assurance of
tenure that would be lacking if he could be evicted by a landlord....
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psychological advantage and the financial advantages of condominium
ownership make the condominium a promising device for alleviating
at least some of the problems associated with urban sprawl.
The condominium does seem to offer an attractive alternative to
the middle-income consumer who may otherwise be faced with the
dilemma of either living in a rental unit all his life in order to be
reasonably near his job and cultural, educational, recreational and
entertainment facilities, or of owning his own house at a considerable
distance from these facilities.
By owning his own apartment rather than paying rent, the con-
dominium owner eliminates that portion of his housing cost which
would be the landlord's profit.6 In this respect he is better off than his
apartment-renting counterpart. Furthermore, he has many of the
same derivative advantages the apartment dweller has, such as mass
purchases of supplies and services. These advantages may also include
access to such luxuries as a swimming pool, golf course, and other
recreational facilities which are not normally as accessible to the aver-
age owner of a single-family dwelling.
The condominium also seems to be a promising means by which
lower-income individuals, whose level of income and lack of means
of transportation effectively preclude the possibility of home ownership
in the urban fringes, may attain the status of home ownership with
its concomitant advantages.7
I. THE CONDOMINIUM CONCEPT IN WASHINGTON
A. Development of the Condominium Concept
A pioneer commentator in the field has defined "condominium" as:
[a] combination of two kinds of ownership: one, the owner-
Cribbet, Condominium,--Home Ownership for Megalopolis? 61 Mica. L. REv. 1207,
1235-36 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cribbet].
6. Included in rent are also factors reflecting the costs of turnover in occupancy
such as loss of rental payments because of vacancies in other apartment units, and costs
of cleaning and redecorating units (which is generally done less frequently in con-
dominium apartments, since owners probably take better care of the premises than
renters). Note, however, that the condominium owner is losing the income he would
otherwise realize on the capital he has tied up in the down payment. See Kerr, supra
note 4, at 11.
7. For a more pessimistic view of the impact of the condominium concept on low-
income housing, see Quirk & Wein, Homneownership for the Poor: Tenant Condominiums,
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ship in severalty of a part of a building, generally called the
apartment; the other, undivided ownership in common ... with
the owners of other apartments, of the "common elements," that
is, the land and those parts of the building intended for common
use, such as the foundations, columns, main walls, roofs, halls,
corridors, lobbies, stairways, elevators, entrances, utility services
and the like. The undivided ownership is in a fixed ratio, generally
that which the value of the apartment bears to the value of the
entire property....
Seldom in the development of our legal system has a property
concept given rise to such a flurry of activity by both commentators
and legislators as has the condominium concept in the past decade.
This period of activity in the United States commenced with the
passage of the Horizontal Property Act in Puerto Rico in 1958 After
passage of the Act, builders and developers found it difficult to obtain
financing for their condominium ventures. As a result of these financ-
ing problems, pressure was brought to bear on Congress to amend
the National Housing Act, and in 1961 these efforts culminated in the
passage of what is now Section 234 of the Act.Y0 The purpose of
Section 23411
is to provide an additional means of increasing the supply of
privately owned dwelling units where, under the laws of the
State in which the property is located, real property title and
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and the Rockefeller Program, 54
Cou u= L. REV. 811 (1969).
8. Kerr, supra note 4, at 1.
9. P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 21, §§ 1291-1293k (Supp. 1963). Although the condominium
concept was not new to Puerto Rico, having been provided for in the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 which became part of the law of Puerto Rico by virtue of a royal decree
in the same year, these provisions and their subsequent amendments made the con-
dominium too cumbersome a tool to adequately deal with the ever-increasing number of
housing problems encountered by builders and planners on the overcrowded island. The
Horizontal Property Act was passed in 1958 in response to these demands and one
authority has remarked that ". .. a great deal of the credit for the itrban progress
achieved in Puerto Rico during the past few years, is directly attributable to the
adoption of a modem, comprehensive horizontal property statute." A. FEpad= & K.
SrzcHER, LAw or ComwoimnTr § 56 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FRaMRn & STEC cEE.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1715Y (Supp. IV 1968). The section as originally enacted applied
only to family units in a multifamily structure which had been covered by a project
mortgage insured under some other section of the act (except section 213 dealing with
cooperative housing insurance). The Housing Act of 1964, 78 stat. 769, greatly broadened
the scope of section 234 by providing for the insurance of project mortgages directly
under that section. The section was also broadened by permitting the conversion of
investor-sponsored projects, constructed under section 213, to condominiums.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1715Y(a) (Supp. IV 1968).
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ownership are established with respect to a one-family unit which
is part of a multi-family project.
Passage of this section by Congress was the signal the states had
been waiting for, and statutes, many of which were modeled closely
after the Puerto Rico Act or the FHA Model Act,1 2 were passed in
state after state in rapid succession.' Legal commentators also wasted
no time, and a sizeable volume of literature on the condominium has
already been amassed.' 4
B. Condominiums in Washington
The problems of urban sprawl which provided impetus to the move
for adoption of statutory authorization of condominiums have hereto-
fore been encountered primarily on the eastern seaboard and in Cali-
fornia, where the population densities are much higher than in the
Northwest. However, this of course does not mean that the North-
west is immune to such problems. Indeed, it has been estimated by
the Washington State Census Board that the population of the four
most populous Puget Sound counties will reach almost two and three-
quarters million by 1985."5
In 1963 the Washington State Legislature passed the Horizontal
Property Regimes Act,'" which gives statutory authorization for the
development of condominiums in the state.' It is the purpose of this
12. For a text of the Model Statute, see P. ROHAIT AND M. RESIcN, COOPERATIVE
HousiNG LAW AND PRACTICE Appendix B-3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as RoHAN &
REsi:rN].
13. Section 234 was signed into law by President Kennedy on June 30, 1961. Ten
days later Hawaii passed a condominium enabling statute. Within two years after the
passage of Section 234, 38 states bad passed enabling legislation. See Kerr, supra note 4,
at 5.
14. See E. BREUER, CONDOMINIUM (1962) a bibliography of condominium-related
literature as of late 1962, published by the New York State Library. RoHAN & REsKIN,
supra note 12, and FERRER & STxcZER, supra note 9, both contain updated bibliographies
on the subject.
15. Washington State Census Board, Population Forecasts, State of Washington
1965-1985 (State Planning Series #4 1966). This forecast covered the counties of King,
Pierce, Snohomish and Kitsap, which had a combined population of 1,660,000 in 1966. A
Foreward Thrust election bulletin issued in the Winter of 1967 predicted that the
population of King County alone would increase by 750,000 between 1967 and 1980.
Widespread Boeing Company cutbacks in employment in 1970 in King and Snohomish
Counties will probably result in these projections being scaled down somewhat, but
the long-term outlook probably remains unchanged.
16. WASHi. REV. CODE ch. 64.32 (1969).
17. Under the common law it was possible in at least some jurisdictions for a
condominium-type ownership scheme to exist without the express authorization of a
statute. See Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative,
So CAL. L. REv. 299, 301 (1962). Flat ownership had long been recognized in England,
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comment to analyze the condominium concept in Washington from the
perspective of the potential purchaser, to elaborate on the advantages
of owning a condominium unit in Washington, and to point out the
possible liabilities which the purchaser might incur as a result of such
ownership. The discussion will of necessity be carried out on a some-
what abstract plane since experience with the statute during its seven-
year existence has been limited and case law is as yet non-existent.
There is a similar dearth of case law in other jurisdictions. Even so,
identification of potential problems resulting from ownership of
condominiums should enable the draftsman to avoid many of the
potential risks of such ownership. A separate problem, which is not
considered in this comment, is that the sale of an interest in a con-
dominium may be considered to be the sale of a security which must
be registered under federal or state securities laws.
II. MANAGEMENT
A. Types of Management
The Washington statute gives the apartment owners' association
wide discretion in choosing the type of entity it wishes to have
manage the condominium. The Association's bylaws may specify
"whether administration of the property shall be by a board of direc-
tors elected from among the apartment owners, by a manager, or
managing agent, or otherwise.... 218
Disputes over management, not unexpectedly, have produced a
great deal of strife in cooperative housing ventures of various types,"9
and there is no reason to believe that condominiums will be immune
from such disputes. Characteristically the disputes arise over fiscal
or maintenance policies of the managing entity. As a leading writer
points out:20
and ownership of a part of a building is mentioned in CoxE, ON LTLETON. See the
discussion in FEum AND STEcmR, supra note 9, at § 54. Such projects were not
common in the United States prior to passage of the various acts, however, and this
author is aware of no such projects in Washington prior to the passage of our con-
dominium statute.
18. WAsHr. Rsv. CODE § 64.32.090(11) (1969). This language does not seem to
preclude incorporation of the apartment owners association as a non-profit corporation,
but the author's investigation indicates that at least in residential condominium develop-
ments in Washington it is not the practice to do so.
19. See Rohan, Condominium Housing: A Purchaser's Perspective, 17 STAN. L. lav.
842, 855 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Rohan].
20. Id. at 855-56.
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[O]ne group favors expenditures for improvement of the prop-
erty, such as installation of self-service elevators, central air
conditioning, and similar features, or for nonessential services
such as doormen and handymen on twenty-four-hour call. The
opposing camp seeks to keep carrying charges to a bare minimum
by paring expenditures wherever possible.
Aside from differences in policy, however, there is another sig-
nificant area of potential strife. In some condominium ventures the
mortgagees may insist on provisions for professional management to
protect the value of their collateral,2 but in other condominiums,
particularly those with but a few apartments, the owners may be
tempted to economize by providing for management by a board of
directors elected from among the apartment owners themselves. In
many cases this turns out to be a false economy, since22
[s]hortsighted economies and outright mismanagement may pro-
duce a decline in essential service, amenities, and eventually
property values. Special assessments may become necessary to
balance an overly optimistic budget or to eliminate a no-man's
land created when an overly cautious board (uncompensated and
possibly underinsured) refuses to assume jurisdiction over part
of the property or over a community problem.
Furthermore, the efficiency of this mode of management is often
hampered by dickering and petty squabbles among the members of
the association's board of directors.2 3 Even if his mortgage lender
does not so insist, the buyer would be well advised to be certain that
the condominium under consideration is now managed by a profes-
sional manager and that it will continue to be so managed before he
purchases an apartment therein.
B. Restrictions on Occupancy and Alienation
Since condominium living normally involves families living in close
proximity to one another and sharing the use of common areas and
21. See Kerr, Problems of the Mortgage Lender, Symposium on the Practical Problems
of Condominium 25, May 11, 1964; Rohan, supra note 19, at 856.
22. Rohan, supra note 19, at 856.
23. The story has been related to the author about a business executive in California
who resided in a condominium apartment and served (uncompensated) on the con-
dominium's board of directors. Much to his chagrin he found the position, because of
repeated petty bickering among the board members, to be much more onerous than
the duties demanded of him as a compensated board member of several corporations.
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facilities, a relatively high degree of social compatibility among such
families is necessary to the smooth functioning of the condominium.
A condominium project may be designed for retired persons and
cater to the leisure-time interests of such persons; it may be spon-
sored by a labor union which wishes to keep it exclusively for mem-
bers of that union; or it may be designed for persons who want to
live in an area free of small children and pets. Moreover, since deci-
sions regarding the expenditure of money for improving the building
or grounds are made by a majority of apartment owners, it is in the
best interests of both present and prospective owners to assure that
their general attitudes and views on such matters are reasonably
consonant.
To the extent that persons with the same types of interests fall
within the same general economic or income groups, the price of the
condominium units will automatically insure a rough degree of homo-
geneity. In addition, other, more precise devices are normally utilized
by the condominium management to insure compatibility among the
owners. Primary among these are the right of first refusal on resale,
and general "house rules" governing the use of the common areas,
permissible levels of noise, and the like.
1. Right of First Refusal on Resale
The right of first refusal, or pre-emptive option as it is sometimes
called, is a method by which the association can exercise control over
who will become an apartment owner. Pursuant to such a right, an
apartment owner desiring to sell his apartment, having found a
prospective purchaser, must first offer the apartment to the managing
entity. Commonly he is also required to furnish certain information
about the prospective purchaser to the owners' association, and if
the owners do not approve of the prospective purchaser they may
purchase the apartment upon the same terms (or provide another
prospective purchaser who is willing to do so) within a period of time
specified in the declaration or bylaws of the condominium project2 4
24. See Hershman, Operating Problems of the Condominium, Symposium on the
Practical Problems of Condominium 38, May 11, 1964. The declaration of the Highlander,
one of the first condominiums in Washington, provides that the board of directors of the
association has seven days within which to match the offer of purchase, lease, or
rent received by the prospective seller. The declaration of Mercer West provides for a
period of thirty days within which the board may match the offer.
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Most scholars have concluded that a provision such as this, since its
terms are not unreasonable, is not invalid as a restraint against aliena-
tion,25 but the matter is not entirely settled.26
Even if a right of first refusal is not held invalid as an unreasonable
restraint on alienation, there may be other grounds for holding it
invalid. A number of commentators have discussed the possibility
that such a provision would be in violation of the rule against per-
petuities.27 Since the right of first refusal is essentially an option to
purchase real property, it may be deemed to create an interest in
real property which cannot vest until the option is, or may be, exer-
cised. It may thus be necessary to limit the option period to a period
which would be valid under the rule, measured from the delivery of
the deed. In addition, the problem might be circumvented by con-
25. Id. at 41. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 CoLuM.
L. REv. 987, 1018 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
26. This type of provision is certainly more reasonable than some which have been
upheld in the stock cooperative situation, such as every prospective purchaser's being
subject to approval by the board, or the board's having the right to purchase the seller's
interest at book value rather than market value. See Berger, supra note 25, at 1017.
However, there is a significant distinction between the situation of a tenant-cooperator in
a cooperative housing venture and that of the apartment owner in a condominium
venture: the former has merely a leasehold, whereas the latter has a fee interest. The
rule against restraints on alienation applies to fee interests, but it does not apply to
leasehold interests; this is perhaps why the stringent restrictions on attempted resale
by the tenant-cooperator have been judicially upheld. See, e.g., Weisner v. 791 Park
Avenue Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959). The necessity
for compatibility among occupants is certainly as compelling in the condominium as it
is in the stock cooperative, however, and "the reasonableness of a restraint ought not
to depend on a mechanical distinction between freeholds and leaseholds." Berger, supra
note 25, at 1019.
27. Kerr, supra note 4, at 46; Rubens. Right of First Refusal and Waiver of the
Right of Judicial Partition, 14 HASTINGs LJ. 255, 259-60 (1963); Hershman, Operating
Problems of the Condominium, Symposium on the Practical Problems of the Con-
dominium 41-42, May 11, 1964.
28. This potential problem has apparently been either disregarded or overlooked by
the Washington legislature; neither the statute nor any of the condominium declarations
examined by the author contains even a fleeting reference to the rule. RoHMAN & RFsn¢N,
supra note 12, point out at § 10.03 that legislative action on this problem has been taken
only in Utah and Rhode Island.
It may be that courts will be extremely hesitant to apply the rule in the condominium
setting since there are policy arguments militating against its application. See Leach,
Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 HARv. L. REV.
1318, 1321-22 (1960). The drafter of condominium documents should be able to minimize
problems stemming from application of the rule, however, by referring to some specific
standard by which the period is to be measured as an alternative to the period of
existence of the condominium project. This could be done by a provision similar to the
following: The right of first refusal shall be valid so long as this condominium project
is in existence, but if such right is found to violate the rule against perpetuities, then
it shall be valid for a period measured by the lives of all the original purchasers of the
apartments plus twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of them.
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veying only a determinable fee to each apartment owner, but as a
practical matter it would probably be impossible to obtain the accep-
tance of purchasers and mortgagees of such a scheme.
There is another possible ground on which a right of first refusal
might be struck down by the courts. If it is exercised so as to dis-
criminate against prospective purchasers on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin it would probably be held to be illegal.29
There are three basic approaches under which the right of first refusal,
if it is being used as a tool of discrimination, could be attacked. The
first is the straight constitutional approach by finding a large enough
element of state action to invoke the self-executing provisions of the
fourteenth amendment."' The second is based on 42 United States
Code § 1982, taken from the Civil Rights Act of 186631 and rein-
terpreted in a recent case to "bar all racial discrimination, private as
well as public, in the sale or rental of property ... 2 The third
approach involves invoking the Open Housing Act of 196811 which
proscribes discrimination on racial grounds in the terms and condi-
tions of a housing sale and makes illegal a refusal to sell or negotiate
after a bona fide offer is received. 4 It is thus clear that the right
of first refusal will be vulnerable to attack if it is used to discriminate
against prospective purchasers on racial or other proscribed grounds.
2. General "House Rules"
The Washington statute provides that the declaration shall contain85
[a] statement of the purposes for which the building and each
of the apartments are intended and restricted as to use ...
29. See generally Morris & Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open
Housing, 44 WAsHr. L. REv. 1 (1968).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
31. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
32. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
33. Open Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 83. If the determinable fee devise were used
to discriminate against prospective purchasers on a basis such as race it might be
immune from attack under Shelley since the estate of the prospective seller would
terminate automatically, by operation of law, but it would still most likely run afoul of
42. U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) and/or the Open Housing Act of 1968.
34. Open Housing Act of 1968, § 804(a), (b), 82 Stat. 83. It is possible that the sale
of a condominium apartment might fall within the single-family-dwelling exception of the
statute, § 803(b) (1), but since it would be the other apartment owners and not the
seller attempting to discriminate, the exception might be held inapplicable.
35. WASH. R "v. CODE § 64.32.090(7) (1969).
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The statute also provides for the adoption of bylaws "for the adminis-
tration of the property or for other purposes. . . 2"1 These two provi-
sions are the statutory base for the promulgation of rules governing
use of apartments in a condominium project and conduct in the
common areas, such rules generally being necessary for the main-
tenance of harmony in any type of multi-family housing. It is one
thing to have such rules regulating the use of condominium apart-
ments and the conduct of their occupants; it is quite another to have
adequate measures at hand to enforce them. In most cases informal
social pressure will probably cause the errant apartment owner to
take appropriate steps to remedy the offending situation or to refrain
from engaging in the offending conduct. To deal with those owners
who do not succumb to such informal coercive measures, however,
the Washington statute gives a broad mandate to the owners asso-
ciation to remedy the situation:"
Failure to comply with the rules specified in the declaration or
adopted in the bylaws pursuant thereto shall be grounds for an
action to recover sums due, for damages or injunctive relief, or
both, maintainable by the manager or board of directors on
behalf of the association of apartment owners or by a particularly
aggrieved apartment owner.
C. Termination
Since the apartment owner will normally have a sizeable invest-
ment in his apartment, it is important for him to ascertain what his
rights are upon termination of the condominium venture. There are
apparently two ways in which termination can be effected. First, the
apartment owners may by unanimous agreement remove the property
from condominium status by recording an instrument to that effect38
and thereafter they will be deemed to be owners in common of the
property in the same percentages as they previously owned the com-
mon areas. 9 The second method of termination occurs by operation
of law if all or part of the property is damaged and the apartment
36. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.32.090(11) (1969).
37. WAsH. REV. CODE § 64.32.060 (1969).
38. WAs . REV. CODE § 64.32.150(1) (1969). Note that all mortgagees and lien
holders must also consent to the change in status, and an instrument to that effect must
also be recorded. Id.
39. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.32.150(2) (1969).
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owners do not decide within ninety days to repair or reconstruct the
buildings. The apartment owners thereby become owners in common
of all the property.4 In the latter case the statute explicitly provides
for the right of an apartment owner to bring an action for partition,41
and although there is no similar provision for when the venture is con-
sensually terminated, the apartment owner here will probably have
the same right.
III. FINANCING
A. Individual Financing of Units
Most commentators agree that the condominium's most striking
advantage to the individual desiring some type of community housing
is the availability of separate financing 3 The Washington statute
specifies that each apartment, together with its undivided interest in
the common areas and facilities, is to be considered real property.44
It also provides: 45
[L]iens or encumbrances shall arise or be created only against
each apartment and the percentage of undivided interest in the
common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartment in
the same manner and under the same conditions in every
respect as liens or encumbrances may arise or be created upon
or against any other separate parcel of real property subject to
individual ownership....
The purchaser of a condominium apartment can thus finance his
purchase by giving a note secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on
his separate parcel4 He can arrange his own individual plan of
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.32.230 (1969).
41. Id.
42. See W. BuiRY, REAL PROPERTZ § 101 (1965). Certain fact patterns may present
some practical difficulties, however; see, e.g., Carter v. Weona Beach., 71 Wn. 2d 498,
429 P.2d 201 (1967).
43. Kerr, supra note 4, at 14-15; Berger, supra note 25, at 994; Cribbet, supra
note 5, at 1237.
44. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.32.030 (1969).
45. WAsH. REV. CODE § 64.32.070 (1969). This provision is taken directly from § 9(a)
of the FHA Model Act, and is found in condominium statutes in virtually all of the
states. See FaRm AxD STEaER, supra note 9, at Part Four, for texts of all the state
statutes.
46. WASH. ftv. CODE § 64.32.070 speaks of 'iens or encumbrances"; other sections
of the statute refer specifically to mortgages. It is assumed that in both instances the
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financing, including the amount of the down payment, the term of
the mortgage or deed of trust, and provisions for accelerated payments.
B. Assessments for Common Expenses
The condominium declaration may contain a provision for the
collection of sums assessed by the association of apartment owners
for the share of common expenses chargeable to each owner.4 7 Assess-
ments may be made for such routine expenditures as janitorial and
lawn care, normal building maintenance, garbage and refuse collec-
tion and insurance premiums on the structure, and they may be made
for some major new project such as a swimming pool or sauna bath
facilities. Declarations seldom require unanimous consent of the
apartment owners for approval of projects requiring even large ex-
penditures, and a dissenting owner may find himself obliged to
contribute toward a project he does not want or cannot afford.48
Measures permitted by the Washington statute to enforce these
assessments can be quite severe.49
[T]he collection may be enforced in any manner provided in
the declaration including but not limited to (a) ten days notice
shall be given the delinquent apartment owner to the effect that
unless such assessment is paid within ten days any or all utility
services will be forthwith severed and shall remain severed until
such assessment is paid, or (b) collection of such assessment may
be made by such lawful method of enforcement, judicial or extra-
judicial, as may be provided in the declaration and/or bylaws.
In contrast to the ordinary home owner who owns a single family
dwelling and who can generally defer a major capital outlay until he
can make provision for it in his budget, the condominium apartment
owner is tied to the financial decisions of the specified majority of
apartment owners. According to a noted authority on condominiums,
terms encompass the deed of trust (which was provided for specifically by the Legislature
in 1965, now WASH. RaV. CODE ch. 61.24), but this situation does suggest an appropriate
area for clarification by the Legislature.
47. WASH. Rav. CODE § 64.32.200 (1969). Every declaration in the King County
Auditor's Office examined by this author in April, 1969 contained such a provision.
48. Note that WASH. REV. CODE § 64.32.180 (1969) provides:
[Njo apartment owner may exempt himself from liability for his contribution toward
common expenses by waiver of the use or enjoyment of any of the common areas and
facilities ....
49. WASH. RaV. CODE § 64.32.200 (1969).
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the most common items necessitating a special assessment of the apart-
ment owners are: (1) post casualty repairs to the extent not covered
by insurance, (2) renovation and improvement projects, (3) purchases
of apartments by the association through exercise of a right of first
refusal or on foreclosure, (4) uncollected assessments from a de-
faulted owner, and (5) budget deficits occasioned by poor planning
or by non-recurring expenses such as the costs of litigation in which
the association is involved.5"
Viewed from the perspective of the dissenting apartment owner, the
provisions in the statute and the declaration and bylaws permitting
imposition of financial decisions of the majority on all apartment
owners with recourse to severe enforcement procedures may seem
unfair. But if unanimous consent of the apartment owners were
required before any significant expenditure could be made for any
purposes, such as those in the preceding paragraph, one or a very
few recalcitrant owners could effectively cripple the operation of the
condominium. It is thus necessary to have a provision of this type
in the declaration. The prospective purchaser should be cognizant
of the problems which may arise with respect to condominium special
assessments, and should make it a point to inform himself of the
specific provisions relating to special assessments in the particular
condominium development under consideration.
Before the buyer purchases a condominium apartment he should
also apply to the managing entity of the condominium for a statement
of the amount of unpaid assessments, if any, of the grantor, since the
statute provides that the grantee will be jointly and severally liable
with the grantor for the amount of any unpaid assessments, or for the
amount specified in the manager's statement.51 The buyer should take
into consideration the amounts of such unpaid assessments when arriv-
ing at the amount he is willing to offer the grantor for the apartment.
50. Rohan, supra note 19, at 857.
51. See WASH. REv. CODE § 64.32.210 (1969). It is not clear from this section whether
the buyer is entitled to the statement Prior to his actual purchase of the apartment,
since the statute speaks in terms of "the grantee." However, the provision would certainly
be of limited utility to him if he were not entitled to the statement until after he had
committed himself to the purchase. The estoppel provision in the statute would also be
virtually meaningless if the buyer were not entitled to the statement until after his
purchase.
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IV. TAXATION
A. Individual Income Tax Aspects of Condominium Ownership
The Internal Revenue Code offers several significant tax advantages
to owners and buyers of homes. These same benefits are also avail-
able to owners of condominium apartments. Briefly stated, they are:
(1) the deduction of interest paid on mortgage indebtedness; (2) the
deduction of payments for real property taxes; and (3) the non-
recognition of gain on the sale of one's principal residence if the
owner reinvests in a new residence within one year. In addition, cer-
tain business deductions may be available where the condominium
apartment owner rents his apartment.
1. Deduction of Interest Payments on Mortgage Indebtedness
Section 163 of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 allows as a
deduction "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on
indebtedness."52 A Treasury Regulation issued pursuant to this
section provides that a taxpayer may deduct interest paid on a mort-
gage upon real property of which he is the legal or equitable owner,
as long as it is his personal indebtedness." The purchaser of the
condominium should encounter no problems in availing himself of the
interest deduction permitted by section 163."
2. Deduction for Payment of Property Taxes
Section 164 of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 allows a
deduction for property taxes paid (or accrued if the taxpayer uses
the accrual accounting method) during the taxable year.55 The regu-
lations promulgated under that section make it clear that such taxes
are deductible only by the person upon whom they are imposed.56 It
appears clear that the owner of a condominium apartment in Washing-
ton will be able to deduct property tax payments since the Washington
statute provides that57
52. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 163.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b) (1959).
54. See also Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 (Part I) Cim. BuLs. 300.
55. INTr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 164.
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1 (1957), as amended, T.D. 6406, 1959-2 Cum. BulL. 66.
57. WASH. R.v. CODE § 64.32.190 (1969). This section is taken nearly verbatim from
Section 20 of the FHA Model Act.
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[e] ach apartment and its undivided interest in the common areas
and facilities shall be deemed to be a parcel and shall be subject
to separate assessments and taxation by each assessing unit for
all types of taxes authorized by law including but not limited to
special ad valorem levies and special assessments....
As with other types of real property, the condominium owner cannot
deduct assessments for benefits such as street or sewer improvement
projects which tend to increase the value of the property assessed. 8
3. Non-recognition of Gain on Sale of Residence
Section 1034 of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 provides
that, subject to some restrictions, the gain realized from the sale of a
taxpayer's principal residence is not recognized if the proceeds are
reinvested in another residence within one year prior to or subsequent
to the date of sale.59 In a 1964 Revenue Ruling, the Commissioner
stated that60
[a]n individual who sells his principal residence and uses the
proceeds within one year after the sale to purchase an apartment
in a "condominium" apartment project which he uses as his new
principal residence is entitled to the relief provided for by section
1034(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The "principal residence" requirement of section 1034 will, of course,
effectively preclude those persons who buy a condominium apartment
for recreational or other purposes and maintain a principal residence
elsewhere from taking advantage of the provisions of this section.8'
B. Status of the Association for Income Tax Purposes
The Washington statute defines an "association of apartment
owners"l as6
2
all of the apartment owners acting as a group in accordance
with the bylaws and with the declaration as it is duly recorded
or as they may be lawfully amended.
58. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 164(c) (1).
59. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1034.
60. Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 (Part I) Cum. BuLL. 300.
61. A survey by the author of County Auditors in April 1969 indicated that of
the approximately 1600 condominium units then legally in existence in Washington, 266,
or approximately 15%, could be classified as being held for recreational purposes. See
Appendix, infra.
62. WAsr. Rav. CODE § 64.32.010(4) (1969).
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The condominium apartment owners have wide discretion in choosing
the exact entity which will manage the project,63 but it is clear that
whatever form the managing entity takes, it may possibly be subject
to income taxation as a business association or corporation. However,
it should be noted that condominium associations will only rarely have
a material amount of taxable income, and that such circumstances may
in most cases be planned against.
Commentators have pointed out the possibility of adverse tax con-
sequences to the condominium apartment owners if the management
association is taxed as a corporation.64 The INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954 makes it clear that an "association" is taxed as a "corpora-
tion,"65 and the regulations specify six characteristics relevant to a
determination of whether or not the organization will be treated as
an "association" for tax purposes.66 These are: (1) associates,6 7 (2)
an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom,6"
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.32.090(11) (1969) states that the bylaws required by that
section may specify "whether administration of the property shall be by a board of
directors elected from among the apartment owners, by a manager, or managing agent,
or otherwise. . . ." This language seems broad enough to include a corporate form of
organization as well. See the discussion regarding types of management at notes 18-23
and accompanying text, supra.
64. See, e.g., Cribbet, supra note 5, at 1241-42; 21 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 529, 533-36 (1969);
18 VAND. L. Rv. 1832, 1841 (1965); 50 CAL. L. Rxv. 299, 334-36 (1962).
65. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a) (3).
66. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
67. Neither the Code nor the Regulations contains a definition of "associates," but it
seems clear from the plain meaning of the word that the individual members of the
association of apartment owners would fall within its scope.
68. This characteristic would probably be considered to exist if some of the con-
dominium apartments are operated on a part-time rental basis for the profit of the
whole organization. A question may be presented, however, when the condominium
apartments are rented only temporarily and only as a result of purchase on exercise of
management's right of first refusal. A recent case held in a somewhat analogous situation
that a trust, which had as its principal asset an apartment building, was conducting a
business for the purpose of gain where the trust was responsible for the maintenance of
the building, the rental of the apartment units, and the collection of rents. Mid-Ridge
Inv. Co. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Wis. 1962). The possibility that the
association of apartment owners of a residential condominium will be deemed to be
carrying on a business for the purpose of gain is thus very real, and perhaps could be
avoided only by judicious drafting of the declaration and bylaws, omitting any power to
rent apartments acquired by the exercise of a right of first refusal. Of course such a
provision might be undesirable for other reasons. The remaining apartment owners might
end up with several units purchased by the exercise of a right of first refusal. Then while
seeking buyers for them they would be assessed for the mortgage payments and other
common expenses which would normally be borne by the owners of such apartments, and
the apartments would not be producing any rental revenue to offset these expenses.
Furthermore, it is possible that by regularly exercising a right of first refusal and
reselling the apartments so acquired for a price greater than the purchase price, the
association may be deemed to be in the business of selling apartments and thereby be
taxed on the profit therefrom at ordinary income rates rather than at capital gains rates.
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(3) continuity of life, 9 (4) centralization of management, 0 (5)
limited liability for debts7 1 and (6) free transferability of interests.72
69. It seems clear from the definition of "continuity of life" in the Regulations that
the condominium has this attribute, since "death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resig-
nation, or expulsion of any member will not normally cause a dissolution" of the
association of apartment owners. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960). The provisions
of the Washington statute do not seem to preclude the possibility of providing for a
dissolution of the association every time one of the quoted events occurs, but such a
provision would be of limited practicality, particularly in an association with a large
number of members. The condominium venture will normally be terminated only by the
assent of all the unit owners and the consent of their mortgagees pursuant to WASH. RIv.
CoDE § 64.32.150 (1969), or by the destruction of or damage to all or a part of the
property as specified in WASH. Rlv. CODE § 64.32.230 (1969).
70. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960) provides:
[Clentralized management means a concentration of continuing exclusive authority
to make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization which do not
require ratification by members of such organization.
The determination of whether or not centralization of management is present apparently
turns on the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy, since that Regulation goes on to provide:
[Tlhere is no centralized management when the centralized authority is merely to
perform ministerial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal.
This suggests that centralization of management could possibly be avoided by drafting
the bylaws to permit the managing entity to perform only the barest minimum of
functions without the necessity of some type of ratification by the members of the
apartment owner association. Such a scheme would be extremely impractical if the
condominium had more than a few apartment owners, however, and this fact is
recognized in the Regulation. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-(2) (c) (1) (1960). It is likely
that condominiums with more than a few apartment owners would not be able to avoid
meeting the centralization of management criterion.
71. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-(2)(d)(1) (1960) provides that "an organization has
the corporate characteristic of limited liability if under local law there is no member
who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against the organization." Generally,
members of an unincorporated association are liable as principals on all contracts made
by officers or agents acting within the scope of their agency, and the rule in Washington
is in accord. See Lumber Mart. Co. v. Buchanan, 69 Wn. 2d 658, 419 P.2d 1002 (1966);
Abel v. Firs Bible Missionary Conf., 57 Wn. 2d 853, 360 P.2d 356 (1961); Ginnis v.
Southerland, 50 Wn. 2d 557, 313 P.2d 675 (1957).
Washington's condominium statute contains no reference to the contractual liability
of the apartment owners on contracts entered into by the managing entity; the common
law rule would thus apparently be applicable. The Washington statute does not pre-
clude incorporation of the association, however, and if such were done it would most
likely result in limited liability of the members. WAsHr. Rav. CoDE § 64.32.240 (1969)
does contain a unique provision regarding the tort liability of the apartment owners
which in effect limits the individual liabilities of the owners. See the discussion thereof
at notes 87-94 and accompanying text, infra. Viewed on the whole, however, it is not
likely that the individual members will be deemed to have limited liability unless the
association is incorporated.
72. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1) (1960) states:
[A]n organization has the corporate characteristics of free transferability of interests
if each of its members or those members owning substantially all of the interests in
the organization have the power, without the consent of other members, to substitute
for themselves in the same organization a person who is not a member of the
organization.
There can be no doubt that membership in the association of apartment owners has
this characteristic since each owner generally owns a fee interest in his apartment. WASH.
Rv. CODE § 64.32.030 and § 64.32.120 (1969). Note that by virtue of the definition of
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In order for an organization to be taxed as a corporation it is not
necessary that all these characteristics be present," but the regulations
specify that a majority of them, including associates and an objective
to carry on business, must be present before the group will be so
taxed."4
An analysis of these factors as applied to an ordinary condominium
as may exist in Washington suggests that there is a very real possibility
that the managing entity of the condominium will be taxed as a
corporation. The resulting double taxation of the apartment owners
if the association is taxed as a corporation is a factor to be con-
sidered by the potential buyer before purchasing an apartment.7
C. Real Property Taxes and Assessments
Each apartment and its undivided interest in the common areas
and facilities is separately assessed and taxed by each local assessing
unit.76 In theory the total assessed value of a condominium building
containing fifty condominium apartments should be the same as that
of a similar apartment house with the same number of rental apart-
ments. But as a noted commentator has pointed out,
77
"apartment owner" in WASH. REv. CODE § 64.32.010(2), a person who owns or possesses
an apartment "by way of leasehold or by way of a periodic estate, or in any other
manner in which real property may be owned, leased or possessed in this state . . 2"
can also be an "apartment owner." The quoted portion in the preceding sentence is not
contained in the FHA Model Act.
This conclusion of free transferability is not altered by the presence of a right of
first refusal provision in the declaration or bylaws, although the Internal Revenue
Service has recognized that the presence of such a provision may have some effect on
the transferability of the interest. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960) states:
[If each member of an organization can transfer his interest to a person who is
not a member of the organization only after having offered such interest to the
other members at its fair market value, it will be recognized that a modified form
of free transferability of interests exists. (Emphasis added).
73. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960): "An unincorporated organization shall
not be classified as an association unless such organization has more corporate charac-
teristics than non-corporate characteristics."
74. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
75. One writer has suggested a manner in which the adverse tax effect in the con-
dominium situation may be minimized. He suggests the formation of a corporation,
after which each of the apartment owners leases his interest in the common areas to the
commonly-owned corporation. The rent to be paid by the corporation is then set at an
amount equal to each tenant's pro-rata share of all rent charged by the corporation to
any outside tenants. In this manner, the corporation's income would be minimized or
eliminated. Anderson, Tax Aspects of Cooperative and Condominium Housing, in N.Y.U.
TWENTY-FirTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE: ON FEDERAL TAXATION 79, 97-98 (1967).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.32.190 (1969).
77. Berger, The Condominium-Cooperative Comparison, Symposium on the Practical
Problems of Condominium 5, May 11, 1964.
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tax assessors are intensely practical human beings, and faced
with the insistent demand for ever larger tax base and given the
awareness that individual condominium owners may be less able
to protect themselves in the clinches than the single large property
owner, one should not be surprised if some tax assessors react like
intensely practical human beings.
The apartment owner need not be overly concerned with his
neighbor's being in default on his property tax or other assessment,
however, since tax liens arise only on the individual apartment and
its undivided interest in the common areas, 78 and the common areas
cannot be divided or partitioned as long as the project remains a
condominium under the statute.79
V. LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
By his ownership of a condominium apartment and his attendant
membership in the association of apartment owners, the purchaser may
be exposed to liability stemming from both contractual and tortious
activities of the association or its managing entity. 0 Furthermore,
he and his fellow apartment owners face the possibility of a large
casualty loss if the casualty insurance coverage is not adequate
and all or a portion of the condominium is destroyed by fire or other
casualty.81
A. Contractual Liability
Although there is no implied liability of the members of a non-profit
association on contracts of the association, the general rule is that the
members are jointly and severally liable as principals on contracts
purporting to have been made by, for or in the name of the association,
when they have given either their assent or their subsequent ratifica-
tion thereto.' The Washington rule seems to be in accord with this
78. VAsH. REv. CoDE § 64.32.070 (1969).
79. WVASH. Rv. CODE § 6432.050(2), (3) (1969).
80. The exposure of the owner to contractual liability may be reduced or eliminated
by incorporating the association. See the discussion in the text at notes 82-85, infra.
81. The individual owner is empowered to procure insurance for his own apartment.
See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 95-99, infra.
82. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 222 (1920); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 754 (1926).
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general rule.8" It is therefore possible that the apartment owners in a
condominium will be jointly and severally liable on the contracts made
by the apartment owners association or its managing entity. To
minimize the potentially harsh economic effects on an individual
owner of this joint and several liability, the purchaser should insist
on a clause in the declaration or bylaws making any judgment paid
and costs incurred as a result of such liability a common expense,
assessable among all the apartment owners in the same manner as other
common expenses are assessed. 4 This problem also suggests an ap-
propriate area for legislative action. A statute covering contractual
liability should be enacted by the legislature, similar to that which it
enacted with respect to tort liability, by which an action can be brought
only against the association and each apartment owner is liable only
for his pro rata portion of any judgment obtained."
B. Tort Liability
Unlike the situation with respect to contractual liability, the legis-
lature has specifically provided for a limitation to tort liability of con-
dominium apartment owners."6 The statute states that8 7
[a]ctions relating to the common areas and facilities for damages
arising out of tortious conduct shall be maintained only against
the association of apartment owners and any judgment lien or
83. See Lumber Mart Co. v. Buchanan, 69 Wn. 2d 658, 419 P.2d 1002 (1966); Abel
v. Firs Bible & Missionary Conf., 57 Wn. 2d 853, 360 P.2d 356 (1961); Ginnis v.
Southerland, 50 Wn. 2d 557, 313 P.2d 675 (1957). But see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 25.04.130
and 25.04.150 (1955) which specify that in the partnership situation liability is joint
and several only for wrongful acts or omissions of a partner; all other obligations are
joint only.
84. See WAsH. REV. CODE, § 64.32.200 (1969).
85. See note 87, infra. The failure of the legislature to enact such a provision with
respect to contractual liability was possibly based on a belief that by analogy to the
partnership situation, contractual liability of the individual apartment owners would
be joint only. See note 83, supra. A provision such as that suggested in the text would be
desirable to clarify this question.
86. This discussion relates solely to the apartment owner's liability with respect to
injuries incurred in the common areas. His tort liability with respect to injuries taking
place within his apartment would be the same as that of any homeowner. See Note,
Land Occupier Liability in Washington, 43 WAsH. L. REV. 867 (1968). See also Comment,
Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on the Premises, 39 WAsH. L. REv.
345 (1964).
87. WAsH. REv. CODE § 64.32.240 (1969). This provision is not found in the FHA
Model Act or the statute of any other state except Alaska. ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.440
(1966). The text of all the state statutes and of the Model Act can be found in FEaRRE
and STECHER, supra note 9, at Part Four.
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other charge resulting therefrom shall be deemed a common ex-
pense, which judgment lien or other charge shall be removed from
any apartment and its percentage of undivided interest in the com-
mon areas and facilities upon payment by the respective owner
of his proportionate share thereof based on the percentage of
undivided interest owned by such apartment owner. (Emphasis
added).
The purpose of this provision is laudatory, for in its absence the
apartment owners would most likely be held jointly and severally
liable for negligent activities of the management entity or its agents.88
The actual language chosen may create some problems, however,
depending on how broadly the phrases "relating to the common areas"
and "arising out of tortious conduct" are interpreted. Consider the
example of an apartment owner or family member (or perhaps even a
third party in no way associated with the condominium) who causes
injury by his tortious conduct in the common areas. A negligence action
brought by the injured party would seem to "relate to" the common
areas, since the injury was caused by tortious conduct which took
place there. Is the injured party's recourse "only against the associa-
tion of apartment owners"? Does the actual tortfeasor escape liability
entirely by virtue of the statutory provision? Such a result would be
patently absurd, but it cannot be denied that such a reading of the
provision would be at least grammatically permissible.
It is much more likely that the statutory provision was intended to
refer to the normal circumstances in which the owner of a building
is liable in tort to someone injured as a result of improper maintenance
of common areas, 9 and that the association as a whole, and not the
adjacent apartment owner, is to be liable therefor9 0 Even read in this
manner, however, the provision still presents some difficulty. What if
the injury in question were caused by the negligent act of a single
apartment owner acting solely in his own interests, and not on behalf of
88. See, e.g., Roban, Perfecting the Condominium as a Housing Tool; Innovations
in Tort Liability and Insurance, 32 LAw & CONTE-1P. PROB. 305, 308 (1967); 4 R.
POWELL, RA. PROPERTY § 633.24 (1965); BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIP
§ 64 (1968). See also WASu. Rav. CODE §§ 25.04.130 and 25.04.150 (1955) covering tort
liability of partners in the partnership setting.
89. See note 93 and accompanying text, infra.
90. For a recent discussion of land occupier liability law in Washington, see Note,
Land Occupier Liability in Washington, 43 WAsH. L. Rxv. 867 (1968).
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the association as a whole? Are the other apartment owners in the
condominium, through the apartment owners association, deemed to
be coinsurers for their negligent neighbor?"'
A rational approach to the problem would be to impose liability on
the association for tortious injuries incurred in the common areas in
a manner analogous to that in which liability is imposed on the owner
of an apartment house.92 Under this approach there would still be a
problem with respect to tort liability in limited common areas which
are reserved for the use of only certain apartments.93 Legislative
resolution of the problem could be accomplished by providing that
liability arising from tortious conduct in such areas be limited to the
owners of the apartments who share the use of the limited common
area in question. As an alternative, the legislature could add a proviso
to the effect that liens or other charges resulting from a judgment
against the association arising out of its tortious conduct in a limited
common area be assessed against only those apartment owners who
have the exclusive use of that limited common area.
Although the position of the apartment owner in Washington with
respect to his exposure to tort liability is better than that of his counter-
part in practically any other state except Alaska (where it is the
same94), the foregoing discussion indicates that there are still some
questions to be resolved before the buyer can accurately assess the
extent of his exposure to tort liability as the owner of a condominium
apartment.
C. Insurance Coverage
The Washington statute does not make insurance coverage manda-
tory. It provides that95
91. See VA. CODE ANN, § 55-79.37(2) (Supp. 1966) which provides that a unit
owner shall not be liable with respect to the negligence of another co-owner except when
the negligent party is acting on behalf of the association.
92. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 418-19 (3d ed. 1964); F. HARPER & F. JAFxs, TORTS
§ 27.17 (1956). Harper and James state, at 1516, that the owner has a "full duty of
reasonable care to make conditions reasonably safe and [this] includes the obligation of
care to discover unknown perils, as well as to remedy known ones." See also Comment,
Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on Premises, 39 WASm. L. REv.
345, 361-62 (1964).
93. WAsHr. REv. CODE § 64.32.010(11) (1969) defines "limited common areas and
facilities" as those "reserved for the use of certain apartment or apartments to the
exclusion of the other apartments."
94. ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.440 (1966). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.18 (1966) and
Miss. CODE ANN. § 896.15(2) (1968).
95. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.32.220 (1969).
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[T]he manager or board of directors, if required by the declara-
tion, bylaws, or by a majority of the apartment owners, or at the
request of a mortgagee having a mortgage of record covering an
apartment, shall obtain insurance for the property against loss
or damage by fire and such other hazards... as shall be required
or requested.
The statute makes it clear that the individual apartment owner is not
precluded from obtaining insurance on his apartment merely because
the managing entity has or has not procured insurance. 6 In light of
this rather broad mandate for the managing entity to procure insurance
for the condominium on request, the potential buyer will thus want
to know the answers to two questions: (1) Is it necessary for the
apartment owner to procure insurance for himself in addition to that
arranged for by the managing entity? and (2) If so, what types of
coverage are necessary?
As a preliminary matter it should be noted that the statute does not
make an explicit reference to liability insurance, focusing rather on
loss or damage to the condominium property. But the reference
to "loss or damage by fire and . . other hazards . . ." is probably
meant to refer to the types of losses covered by casualty insurance,
and liability coverage has historically been included in the casualty
line07 In any event, insurance companies are writing broad casualty
and liability coverage for condominiums.98
The answers to the purchaser's questions regarding insurance
coverage will require a rather detailed examination of the provisions
96. 1d.
Provision for insurance procured by the managing entity shall be without prejudice
to the right of each apartment owner to insure his own apartment and/or the
personal contents thereof for his benefit.
Note that the statute says nothing about the individual apartment owner's right to
insure his undivided interest in the common areas and facilities. He should be permitted
to do so if he wishes, since he apparently has an insurable interest in them. The overall
premiums would probably be less, however, if the association procured a blanket policy
covering all owners' interests therein.
97. W. VAwCE, HANDBOOK or TE LAW OF InsuRnANc 23 (3d ed. 1951).
98. A condominium policy written by the General Insurance Company (Safeco)
covers the association for liability and fire and the individual unit owner for his
interest in the building. Coverage for the contents of the individual's unit and his
personal liability is handled by use of a tenant's-homeowner's policy, in the same
manner as if he were a normal apartment dweller with no financial interest in the
building. This information was obtained from Safeco's condominium insurance file, by
permission of Mr. Ted Hull of Safeco's Head Office Underwriting Department, in April,
1969.
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of the declaration and practices of the particular condominium venture
in question. The two problems to minimize or eliminate are gaps in
the insurance coverage, which could result in uncompensated-for losses,
and overlapping coverage, which would result in a higher overall
premium expenditure. It is likely that his prospective lender may also
express an interest in these problems, particularly the gap problem,
and a commitment by the lender will normally be contingent on the
latter's satisfaction that there are no significant gaps in coverage."
D. Standing of Owner to Sue in Tort
One significant question to which commentators have generally
given short shrift is the right of an apartment owner to sue the associa-
tion or a fellow apartment owner in tort.1"' As discussed above01 the
Washington statute has a unique provision which states that02
[a]ctions relating to the common areas and facilities for damages
arising out of tortious conduct shall be maintained only against
the association of apartment owners .... (Emphasis added).
This provision is certainly not free from ambiguity, °3 and this
ambiguity is compounded by the legislature's failure to distinguish
between situations in which the plaintiff is an apartment owner and
those in which the plaintiff is a stranger to the condominium venture.
If the provision is meant to apply in both situations, its application
would seem to produce anomalous results. An apartment owner injured
by the tortious act of a fellow apartment owner (or even a non-owner)
would be precluded from suing the tortfeasor, even if the tortfeasor
were acting solely in his own behalf. In this situation, the owner's
only recourse, if any, would be against the association.
The general common law rule is that members of an unincorporated
association are engaged in a joint enterprise, and the negligence of
each member in the prosecution of the enterprise is imputable to the
99. See Rohan, Disruption of the Condominium Venture: The Problems of Casualty
Loss and Insurance, 64 CoLUm. L. REV. 1045, 1051-53 (1964). This article contains a
good general discussion of condominium insurance.
100. The most complete discussion found in the current literature is in Rohan,
Perfecting the Condominium as a Housing Tool: Innovations in Tort Liability and
Insurance, 32 LAW AND CONTEMP. PR B. 305, 312-14 (1967).
101. See text accompanying notes 86-94, supra.
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.32.240 (1969).
103. See the text accompanying note 88, supra.
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other members. Therefore, a member who has suffered an injury through
the tortious conduct of a fellow member may not be able to recover
from the association for such injury.'04 Since the rule in Washington
is apparently in accord with the common law rule,'0 5 the question be-
comes whether or not the quoted portion of the statute grants the
apartment owner a right of action against the apartment owners'
association. It is submitted that it does not. Such a grant is not clear
on the face of the statute, and statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be strictly construed. 0 6 Furthermore, the statute goes on to
provide that 0 7
any judgment lien or other charge resulting (from an action
against the association of apartment owners) shall be deemed a
common expense, which judgment lien or other charge shall be
removed from any apartment and its percentage of undivided
interest in the common areas and facilities upon payment by the
respective owner of his proportionate share thereof based on the
percentage of undivided interest owned by such apartment owner.
This language quite clearly suggests that the statute is directed to the
situation in which a third person has sued the association for damages,
and its purpose is undoubtedly to immunize apartment owners from
all but their fractional share of any tort judgment rendered against the
association. 08
Inability to sue the association or a fellow owner would seriously
diminish the desirability of owning a condominium apartment. How-
ever, it is doubtful that the Washington courts, when confronted with
a case of an apartment owner injured directly by the tortious conduct
of a fellow apartment owner (or a third person) in the common areas,
would hold the injured owner to be precluded from bringing the suit
under the above statute since to do so would be a radical departure
from common law and common sense and it also would not be required
by language of the statute, which is ambiguous. However, the apartment
104. See Annot., 14 AJ.R.2d 473 (1950). There is some authority to the contrary,
however. See, e.g.
, 
Marshall v. Longshoremen's Union, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987
(1962).
105. See Carr v. Northern Pac. Benefit Ass'n, 128 Wash. 40, 221 P. 979 (1924), where
plaintiff brought an action based on an allegation that defendant had negligently selected
incompetent physicians and surgeons as employees of its hospital. No recovery was
allowed since plaintiff himself was a member of the defendant association.
106. In re Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 P. 436 (1926).
107. WAsrn. REv. CODE § 64.32.240 (1969).
108. See RoHAN A'n RESKIN, supra note 12, at § 10A.
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owner's right to sue the association for injuries resulting from im-
properly maintained common areas is more doubtful. As mentioned
above, the rule in Washington is apparently that the association would
be immune, and the section of the condominium statute under dis-
cussion is apparently not directed to that question. About the only clear
conclusion one can draw from a careful consideration of the statute is
that it is in serious need of clarification by the legislature."0 9
CONCLUSION
Real property law has characteristically lagged behind other
branches of the law in responding to the changing demands and re-
quirements of a rapidly evolving society. Although it is not a recent
innovation, the condominium concept has been given new life by the
passage of state enabling legislation, such as the Horizontal Property
Regimes Act in Washington, and appears to be a promising response to
a number of current housing problems. One of the principal attributes
of the condominium concept is its versatility. It appears to be the
most promising method by which lower-income families may ex-
perience the advantages of home ownership. It also affords advantages,
both financial and otherwise, to middle- and upper-income families.
The foregoing discussion has focussed on potential problem areas
in the present statutory scheme in Washington, although the ad-
vantages to the owner have also been suggested, with the aim of indi-
cating to the legislature, drafters of condominium documents and
current and prospective condominium owners some potential hazards
which should either be remedied through public action or at the
minimum protected against through private legal ordering.
Jerry W. Spoonamoore*
109. The common law immunity of the association from suit by a member is
apparently based on an unarticulated notion that the member has a significant degree
of control over the activities of the association and thereby over the physical condition
of the premises. In a multi-apartment condominium this control is probably more illusory
than real, and that basis for holding the association immune from suit by a member-apart-
ment owner does not appear to be present. The legislature should remedy this situation by
explicitly providing for suits against the association by the individual apartment owners.
Note, however, that in the absence of some type of insurance or bond for the association
this might have the anomalous result of having the injured apartment owner contribute
to his own recovery.
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n. B.A. 1961, Willamette; J.D. 1969, University
of Washington.
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APPENDIX*
CoNwOrunZum DF-voPimNTs IN WASHINGTON By COUNTY
(As of April, 1969)
County
Asotin
Benton
Chelan
Clark
Grays Harbor
Jefferson
King
Name of Condominium
Sunny Slope Park
Mowry Square
Lakeview West Residences
The Lafferty Condominium
Litchtenberg Haus
Landover Hill
Gitche Gumee
Shore Chalets
Pacific Surf
The Canterbury Inn
The Beachwood Resort
The Polynesian
The Grey Gull
The Discovery Inn
The Silver King
The Centerbury West
The Admiralty
El Condo
Sequoia Courts
Mercer West
The Highlander
Blue Sky Vista
Armand
Olympic Vista
Richmond Beach West
The Sentinel
La Miranda
Bayview Heights
New Glen Acres
Washington Park Towers
Olympic Plaza
Pinebrook Terrace
Fontanelle Apartments
San Soud
Lakeview Plaza
Seven Highland Drive
Goldener-Adler
* This appendix was prepared as part of the initial research for this comment. It
is not intended as a comprehensive listing of all condominiums in Washington, but
rather as an aid to counsel in securing background for the drafting of instruments re-
lating to condominiums.
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No.
of
Type Units
residential 3
residential 19
residential 8
residential 8
recreational 28
residential 8
commercial 63
commercial 6
commercial 11
commercial 45
commercial 20
commercial 69
commercial 38
commercial 24
commercial 54
commercial 110
recreational/ 38
residential
residential 4
residential 33
residential 17
residential 63
residential 9
residential 4
residential 8
residential 26
residential 28
residential 5
residential 12
residential 62
residential 61
residential 17
residential 44
residential 38
residential 32
residential 6
residential 28
recreational 45
Date
of
Filing
7-20-67
8- 4-66
6-24-65
12-31-68
4- 7-69
1-21-69
5- 3-65
9-21-65
3-22-66
4-21-66
8-12-66
7-18-67
3- 4-68
7- 3-68
7-18-68
8-20-68
8-13-68
7-17-64
7-29-64
11-24-64
12- 4-64
1-26-65
4-30-65
7-25-65
3- 9-67
3-28-67
6-14-67
8- 2-67
1-31-68
2-14-68
2-19-68
4-26-68
6- 4-68
7- 3-68
10- 1-68
11-12-68
1- 6-69
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County
Kittitas
Pacific
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Name of Condominium
Goldener-Hirsch
Hill House
Regency Park
Edelweiss Chalet
The Tradewinds
Ocean Side
Surfside Condominium #1
Surfside Condominium #2
Silver Ski Chalet
Crystal Inn Chalets
Commencement Bay Apts
Old Tacoma Town House #1
Old Tacoma Town House #2
Breakwater Town House
The Carmel
County Club Estate
623 Main Street
Glen Heather Townhouses
Englewood Crest
Glen Heather West
White Pass Village
Type
recreational
residential
residential
recreational
residential/
recreational
recreational
recreational
recreational
commercial
recreational
residential
residential
(incl. doctor's
office)
residential
residential
residential
residential
residential
residential
residential
residential
recreational
No.
of
Units
48
20
22
54
18
18
4
6
61
36
9
3
6
23
15
20
11
24
36
26
55
Date
of
Filing
1- 6-69
4-17-69
5- 7-69
11-29-68
1- 6-67
3-17-67
10-31-67
8- 8-68
8-15-63
12-29-64
5- 6-65
12-28-65
5-29-68
8- 6-65
10-19-67
12-13-67
1-16-69
2-19-68
10- 2-68
3-20-69
10- 2-64
Pierce
Snohomish
Yakima
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